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 PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER GOODYEAR AND 
MCINTYRE ONE STEP FORWARD; ONE STEP BACKWARD? 
JAMES M. BROGAN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) created expectations of 
a restrained approach to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 
state and federal trial courts.  The decisions seemed to be an 
attempt to reign in state and federal district courts which were 
trending to an expansive application of previous Supreme Court 
decisions using confusing and expansive analyses to extend 
personal jurisdiction over both non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. based 
companies and non-U.S. based manufacturers.  While neither 
Goodyear nor McIntyre erased all concerns, they did raise hopes in 
the world wide business community.  These hopes have been 
dashed by a number of inconsistent trial court and appellate 
decisions which confound predictability and further complicate the 
environment surveyed by businesses contemplating transactions or 
expansion in the United States. 
Issued the same day, the Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear 
and McIntyre provided guidelines for manufacturers concerned 
about the prospect of defending their products in United States 
courts.  The Supreme Court’s instruction in Goodyear concerning 
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Defense Research Institute on April 13, 2012, which served as a basis for 
discussion at a workshop and panel conducted the same day.  In addition, I 
discussed the paper at a workshop and panel conducted by the Product Liability 
Advisory Council on October 7, 2011.  I substantially revised and updated the 
essay to reflect the efforts of courts interpreting Goodyear and McIntyre.  As the 
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the exercise of ‘general jurisdiction,’ an extension of jurisdiction 
not dependent on the action arising from the supply of a product 
to the forum state, set relatively solid, well defined boundaries.  
The Supreme Court’s guidance in McIntyre, however, concerning 
the exercise of ‘specific jurisdiction,’ an extension of jurisdiction 
arising from a manufacturer’s product allegedly causing injury in 
the forum state, consisted of a plurality and two other opinions.  
While the sum of the parts justified conservative expectation 
decisions, the lack of consistency across the parts provided an 
excuse for some courts to continue an expansive application of the 
previous Supreme Court decisions. 
It is important to understand that from the perspective of a 
business executive predictability is paramount.  The fact that both 
U.S. and non-U.S. based companies need to consider jurisdiction 
from state to state, and not with respect to the United States as a 
whole, complicates forecasting.  Neither Goodyear nor McIntyre 
touch upon claims arising from federal law or claims which 
implicate a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of 
process.1  In those instances, a court may determine it is 
appropriate to analyze the defendant’s jurisdictionally significant 
contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than limiting the 
analysis to the forum state.  Similarly, neither case impacts the 
jurisdictional analysis or theory used in a minority of states using 
‘long-arm’ statutes that restrict a court’s ability to exercise power 
over a foreign defendant to anything less than the fullest extent 
permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Goodyear and McIntyre 
did, however, raise the expectation that in tort cases, there might 
be more uniformity in the exercise of jurisdiction by state and 
federal courts. 
In Goodyear, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the ‘stream-
of commerce’ test for general personal jurisdiction.  In McIntyre, 
four justices of the Supreme Court arguably took a previously 
announced plurality requirement of ‘stream of commerce plus’ for 
the exercise of jurisdiction to ‘stream of commerce, plus, plus,’ 
requiring the demonstration of a ‘manifest intent’ of the 
manufacturer to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court.  
 
1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (“For a claim that arises under federal law, serving 
a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of 
general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United 
States Constitution and laws.”). 
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Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Kennedy expressly 
rejected the view that a manufacturer is subject to a forum’s 
jurisdiction simply because it placed its goods into the ‘stream of 
commerce,’ knowing or having reason to know those goods will be 
carried to the forum.2  Justice Kennedy emphasized that “the 
stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the 
mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial 
authority that Clause ensures.”3  In other words, a “defendant’s 
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only 
where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a 
general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have 
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”4 
Unfortunately, while Justices Breyer and Alito concurred, they 
chose to rely on existing precedent and the particular facts of 
McIntyre.  They offered that it was “unwise to announce a rule of 
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day 
consequences” and did not find such “relevant contemporary 
commercial circumstances” were presented in the matter.5  They 
determined the case could have been decided simply by “adhering 
to . . . precedents” and that it did not present the opportunity to 
issue “broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional 
rules.”6  
The current situations in two neighboring states, California and 
Oregon, provide ample evidence of the lack of direction provided 
by McIntyre.  In Dow v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 170 (2011), 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District, relying on 
the majority’s decision in McIntyre, held that California courts 
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
manufacturer based on a stream of commerce analysis, where the 
company did not directly ship, sell or advertise its products within 
the state.  In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court determined it 
was not bound by the decision but rather only the narrow holding 
of the concurrence.  It then determined that a Taiwanese 
 
2 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
3 Id. at 2791; see also id. at 2785, 2788 (describing the limits of the stream-of-
commerce metaphor) . 
4 Id. at 2788 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2789 (“[I]t is the defendant’s 
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to 
judgment.”). 
5 Id. at 2791, 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 2792–93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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component part manufacturer was subject to personal jurisdiction 
in Oregon even though it had no direct contact with the state.7  The 
Court determined that the volume of final product containing the 
component sold in Oregon by another manufacturer during a two-
year period – over 1,100 units – established sufficient contacts in 
the state for the Oregon court to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the company. 
Nevertheless, with the caution that the analysis is very much 
factually dependent, the following paragraphs provide a summary 
analysis and simplified list of criteria for evaluating a particular 
entity’s risk of jurisdiction in general, risk of jurisdiction flowing 
from a specific incident and, finally, the risk of jurisdiction as a 
consequence of its dealings with affiliates, particularly subsidiaries. 
2. PERSONAL JURISDICTION GENERALLY 
Personal jurisdiction is the “power of a court over the person of 
a defendant in contrast to the jurisdiction of a court over a 
defendant’s property[.]”8  Grounded in due process concerns 
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the determination of whether a court in the United 
States can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate 
defendant focuses on whether that “defendant has certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”9 
A plaintiff will usually attempt to establish a defendant’s 
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state (i.e., the state in which 
the litigation was brought and/or is pending) through a theory of 
either general or specific jurisdiction.  Plainly stated, general 
jurisdiction exists if the foreign defendant conducts a “continuous 
and systematic”10 part of its general business within the forum 
state, while specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant has 
purposely directed its activities at residents of the forum and the 
 
7 Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 874-75 (2012). 
8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (6th ed. 1990). 
9 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
10 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).  
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litigation results from alleged injuries that “aris[e] out of” or are 
“related to” those activities.11 
A plaintiff may also attempt to establish ‘minimum contacts’ by 
asking the court to impute the jurisdictionally significant contacts 
of another corporate entity to the foreign defendant.  In the context 
of the foreign-parent/U.S.-subsidiary relationship, the plaintiff will 
ask the court to pierce the corporate veil between the two entities 
and/or treat them as alter egos for purposes of determining 
personal jurisdiction.  Similarly, separate from a jurisdictional 
question, a plaintiff may seek to pierce the corporate veil in the 
forum in which a judgment is obtained or the forum in which the 
parent resides once a judgment is obtained.  A more detailed 
discussion of these theories appears below, along with a brief 
analysis of how each theory is implicated by alternate facts. 
3. GENERAL JURISDICTION 
An exercise of general jurisdiction is proper when the 
defendant’s “continuous corporate operations within a state [are] 
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.”12  Though “the commission of certain ‘single or 
occasional acts’ in a State may be sufficient to render a corporation 
answerable in that State with respect to those acts,” such contacts 
may not extend a court’s jurisdiction “to matters unrelated to the 
forum connections.”13  In other words, the general jurisdiction 
inquiry focuses on whether a foreign “corporate defendant’s in-
state contacts [are] sufficiently ‘continuous and systematic’ to 
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to 
those contacts.”14  
As stated by one federal court of appeals, “a finding of general 
jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum 
state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.”15  
Because of these implications, the standard for establishing the 
kind of “continuous and systematic” contacts necessary for general 
 
11 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
12 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2854 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). 
15 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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jurisdiction has been described as, among other things, 
“exacting,”16 “fairly high,”17 and “difficult.”18  Although no precise 
test exists, the defendant’s contacts with the forum must 
“approximate physical presence.”19  Accordingly, a court 
evaluating a theory of general jurisdiction will consider certain 
facts including, but not limited to, whether the corporate 
defendant: 
Is incorporated in the forum state 
Is licensed or authorized to do business in the forum state 
Has a place of business in the forum state 
Owns, rents, or leases real estate in the forum state 
Has contracted with any party located in the forum state 
Maintains an office in the forum state 
Pays taxes in the forum state 
Has a registered agent for service of process in the forum 
state 
Has consented to be sued in the forum state 
Has a bank account(s) in the forum state 
Has a sales force or employees in the forum state 
Maintains its corporate records in the forum state 
It is important to understand that these factors would only be 
relevant to litigation commenced in the state in which the analysis 
is made.  For instance, an entity’s strong ties with Oregon are 
irrelevant to a jurisdictional analysis by a court in Iowa.  Likewise, 
the fact that a manufacturer consented to jurisdiction in Indiana, 
and/or has a place of business in Indiana, would be irrelevant to 
 
16 Id. 
17 Shea v. Bonutti Research, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-615, 2011 WL 53473, at *12 (S.D. 
Ohio Jan. 7, 2011) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 
F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)).   
18 Shea, 2011 WL 53473 at *12 (quoting S. Sys., Inc. v. Torrid Oven, Ltd., 58 
F.Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
19 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 
1086).  
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an analysis of personal jurisdiction if the manufacturer was sued in 
New York. 
4. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
Specific jurisdiction focuses on whether (1) the foreign 
defendant “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of the privilege of doing 
business in the forum state, and (2) the plaintiff’s claims arose from 
or are related to those activities.20  In other words, to establish 
specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the corporate 
defendant purposefully directed its business activities at residents 
of the forum state and that the litigation arises from injuries related 
to those activities.21  When making this determination, the district 
court examines the relationship among the forum, the defendant, 
and the litigation.22  In product liability cases, plaintiffs often 
attempt to establish specific jurisdiction based on a ‘stream of 
commerce’ theory.  The argument is that “placing goods into the 
stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be 
purchased by consumers within the forum State’ may indicate 
purposeful availment.”23  This argument is topically attractive, 
particularly in the case of a manufacturer in the business of making 
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of products, which are 
then shipped and sold all over the world.  After all, why should 
such a manufacturer ‘escape responsibility’ when it ‘knew or 
should have known’ the product would eventually wind its way to 
a consuming public in a prosperous country?  
As described in the introduction, the boundaries of this theory 
are still subject to debate.  Though courts should not determine 
jurisdiction simply because the product leaves the loading dock of 
the manufacturer and ‘floats’ down a river, across an ocean and up 
 
20 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 
(2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) 
(explaining the origin and application of specific jurisdiction doctrine since 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
21 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985) 
(illuminating the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement). 
22 See Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Assoc. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (noting the importance of considering various relationships “in order to 
determine whether ‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State 
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’”) 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
23 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
07_BROGAN REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:26 PM 
818 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
another river, the fact is that large numbers of product provide the 
sort of temptation that some courts can’t resist.24  In King, the court 
stated:  “Here, GM Canada, the entity who built certain vehicles for 
GM Corporation to distribute specifically in the United States, 
including Alabama, cannot genuinely maintain that it does not 
serve the Alabama market.  Stated differently, if not Alabama, 
what market does GM Canada serve?”25 
The plurality in McIntyre would hold that it is not enough to 
demonstrate an intent to serve the U.S. market generally.  In the 
plurality’s words, “it is the defendant’s actions, not his 
expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to 
judgment.”26  To put it another way, the plurality would require 
the proponent of jurisdiction to demonstrate more than “the 
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum 
State.”27  Even the more narrowly drawn concurring opinion 
explicitly rejects the notion that “a producer is subject to 
jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it ‘knows or 
reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a 
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products 
being sold in any of the fifty states.’”28  The failure of the court to 
reach a strong consensus, or at least a majority, nevertheless made 
it possible for courts to interpret the consequences of placing 
products in the stream of commerce liberally. 
Although the decisions are not consistent from state to state, 
entities seeking to avoid the risk of jurisdiction need to account for 
factors which might support a court’s decision to exercise specific 
jurisdiction over a product manufacturer, seller, or distributor.  
They include, but are not limited to, whether the corporate 
defendant: 
Sells its products directly to customers or consumers in the 
forum state 
Designs products specifically addressing the needs of 
customers or consumers in the forum state 
 
24 See Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867 (2012).; see also King v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., No. 5:11-CV-2269-AK, 2012 WL 1340066 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2012). 
25 King, 2012 WL 1340066 at *8. 
26 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
27 Id. at 2788. 
28 Id. at 2793. 
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Controls the distribution of products into the forum state 
Has established or maintained channels for providing 
advice regarding its products specifically for consumers in 
the forum state’s market 
Has conducted marketing efforts specifically directed to the 
forum state market 
Designs, manufactures, or tests its products in the forum 
state 
Has entered into any contracts with residents of the forum 
state that are implicated by the litigation 
For example, it is fairly easy to understand that where a 
manufacturer makes substantial and expensive products outside 
the United States and sells thousands of them directly to customers 
located in a particular state, the manufacturer would find itself 
‘hailed’ into court by a court in the state to which it sent products.  
The analysis clouds where the products are shipped to one state 
but end up being distributed to others.  At one end of the 
spectrum, it is less likely a court will extend jurisdiction where a 
completely separate entity takes ownership of the product and 
sells the product through its distribution channels to a retailer or 
end user.  At the other end of the spectrum, a court is likely to 
extend jurisdiction where the manufacturer ships its products to a 
subsidiary that has not purchased the products or contracted with 
the retailer or end user, and then directs their delivery to retailers 
and/or users in other states. 
The risk of jurisdiction is not limited to mass producers.  A 
court is more likely to extend jurisdiction over a limited production 
manufacturer that makes products ‘per order,’ particularly to meet 
an exacting design required by a particular purchaser in the 
proposed forum state.  Another example is a situation where the 
manufacturer assists a customer in designing the end product in 
which its component is installed.  While McIntyre involved limited 
distribution (one product is indeed extremely limited) but strong 
indications of McIntyre’s desire the product be sold in every state 
in the United States, the fact that the Supreme Court did not 
exercise jurisdiction was based more on the consideration of a lack 
of ‘manifest intent’ that the product would end up in New Jersey 
rather than the limited nature of the distribution. 
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5. ALTER EGO/PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Neither Goodyear nor McIntyre addressed, and therefore did 
not limit or expand existing case law, permitting a plaintiff to 
establish jurisdiction over a corporate defendant through an 
affiliate in certain limited situations.  When a basis for personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent cannot be established 
based on its direct contacts with the forum state, the plaintiff will 
often ask the court to impute the jurisdictionally significant 
contacts of a U.S. subsidiary to the parent.  In essence, this amounts 
to a request that the particular court ignores the corporate 
separateness (or “pierce the corporate veil”) of the parent and 
subsidiary and treat them as “alter ego[s],” or one entity, for 
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction.29  Generally stated, 
under the alter ego analysis, “a non-resident parent corporation is 
amenable to suit in the forum state if the parent company exerts so 
much control over the subsidiary that the two do not exist as 
separate entities but are one and the same for purposes of 
jurisdiction.”30  In other words, an alter ego analysis examines the 
corporate structure of and the relationship between the companies, 
and usually turns on whether the parent exercises excessive 
‘domination and control’ over the subsidiary.  While the factors 
used to make this determination vary state-by-state, the sharpest 
focus tends to be on whether the subsidiary is adequately 
capitalized, and whether the corporations observe corporate 
formalities, and whether they avoid overlap of corporate records, 
functions or personnel.  Overall, affiliates should avoid the 
following factors: 
Commingling or mixing of funds and other assets of the 
entities 
The failure to segregate funds of the separate entities 
The diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than 
corporate uses 
 
29 See Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing courts that have endorsed the use of alter-ego theory to 
establish corporate jurisdiction). 
30 Id. (quoting Danton v. Innovative Gaming Corp., 246 F. Supp.2d 64, 72 (D. 
Me. 2003)). 
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The parent’s treatment of the assets of the subsidiary as its 
own 
The failure to issue stock or to obtain authority to issue 
stock 
The parent’s holding out that it is liable for the debts of the 
subsidiary 
The failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate 
records, and the confusion of the records of the separate 
entities 
The failure to maintain other legal formalities, such as the 
holding of meetings or approval of major actions 
Confusingly similar names among the entities 
Identical ownership in both entities 
Same directors and officers in both entities 
Same individuals responsible for the supervision and 
management of the day-to-day activities of both entities 
The parent’s approval of the day-to-day transactions of the 
subsidiary 
The use of the same office or business location by both 
entities 
The employment of the same employees and/or attorney 
by both entities 
The failure to adequately capitalize the subsidiary 
The absence of separate assets in the subsidiary 
The use of a subsidiary as a mere shell, instrumentality or 
conduit of the parent 
The concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of 
the responsible ownership, management and financial 
interests in the entities, or the concealment of business 
activities 
The failure to maintain arm’s length relationships among 
related entities 
The use of the subsidiary to procure labor, services or 
merchandise for the parent 
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The diversion of assets from the subsidiary by or to the 
parent 
The manipulation of assets and liabilities between the 
entities so as to concentrate the assets in the parent and the 
liabilities in the subsidiary 
The contracting by a subsidiary with a third-party with the 
intent to avoid performance of the contract by use of the 
subsidiary as a shield against liability 
The use of the subsidiary as a subterfuge for illegal 
transactions 
The formation and use of a subsidiary to transfer to it the 
existing liabilities of the parent 
It is not necessary for all of the foregoing factors to be present 
before a court will treat two companies as alter egos.  Likewise, one 
factor standing alone is usually insufficient.  Nevertheless, the 
more factors that are present, the more likely it is that a court will 
exercise jurisdiction over the parent based on the relevant contacts 
of a subsidiary.  Moreover, as the factors demonstrate, piercing the 
corporate veil is a fact-dependent inquiry, making it difficult to 
accurately predict whether a court will exercise jurisdiction under 
this theory in any particular case. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Courts continue to apply inconsistent approaches to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over manufacturers placing 
products in the ‘stream of commerce’ despite the conservatism 
expressed in Goodyear and McIntyre.  Predicting consequences will 
continue to prove difficult, and the Supreme Court may need to 
revisit the issue. 
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